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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the changes effected in the Spanish regulatory
regimes over the last 150 years, and asks what have been the for-
ces driving the regulatory reforms. A study of the Spanish experience
reveals that there was relatively little statutory legislation until 1914
and for a long time there was no reaction to crises. In contrast, re-
gulations have been altered on numerous occasions in the twen-
tieth century. The paper also shows that the regulatory process has
been the result of the interplay between economic as well as poli-
tical economy forces. Moreover, and despite some idiosyncratic fea-
tures, the Spanish regulatory history is similar to that of other
European nations.
1. Introduction
The current international financial crisis has brought the
spectre of a long and profound economic depression. Bank
failures, the need for massive liquidity assistance from central
banks and the intervention of governments bailing out or
partially nationalizing major credit institutions have unveiled
the fragility of the financial structures in many countries. The
regulatory framework in place has revealed its deficiencies
and, if we have learnt anything from this crisis, it is that fi-
nancial regulation and supervision need to be tightened up
and their scope broadened. Bank regulators and supervisors
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have an important and increasingly difficult job: they must en-
sure the integrity of the payments mechanism, they need to
protect the interests of depositors and they have to promote ef-
ficiency in the banking sector.
Spain has undergone a number of regulatory changes in
the last 150 years. By changing the rules, the Spanish authori-
ties have tried to influence the financial structure of the country
and the “modus operandi” of banks and savings banks. They
have done so by resorting to all possible means, restricting
entry into the industry, setting capital requirements or limiting
the scale and scope of the institutions. They did this in the past
and their intervention has not waned in recent times. This ar-
ticle analyzes the history of Spanish financial regulation from
1856 to 2000. Special emphasis is placed on the motivations dri-
ving each of the regulatory changes.
The study of banking regulation and supervision in a small
and peripheral country is of interest for several reasons. First,
the examination of a nation’s case may contribute to a better
understanding of how regulation and supervision have chan-
ged in the last two centuries. Second, Spain´s experience is an
example that, contrary to common belief, regulatory changes
are not always forged in response to crisis. Third, a look at the
Spanish case may shed light on the permanent debate between
the two theoretical approaches that compete to explain the hi-
storic cycles of financial regulations: one based on the influence
of public interest and the other emphasizing the role of private
interest. Fourth, this paper offers a long-term perspective of
Spanish banking regulations for the first time.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We have
indentified four distinct regulatory regimes: “the liberal era”
(1856-1920), the “self-regulated era” (1921-1936), the “interven-
tionist period” (1939-1975), and the post Bretton Woods era
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(1975-2000). The nineteenth-century legislation reflected the li-
beral ideology of the times. Market discipline rather than pu-
blic surveillance prevailed for more than half a century.
Legislation to guarantee financial stability seems not to have
been on the agenda of the public authorities. After 1914, the
banking crises of the interwar period brought to the fore the
need to regulate the financial sector and new legislation was
adopted, although supervision in Spain was entrusted to the
banks themselves. The Civil War marked an abrupt shift in the
regulatory regime, with regulations and strict controls being
imposed in 1939-1942 and again in 1946. Competition was su-
perseded by government discretion, and banks were put at the
service of political-economy goals as defined by the financial
authorities. A cautious process of liberalization began in 1969,
followed by an intense deregulatory process that continued
until the end of the century. This paper shows that both the pri-
vate and the public interest were behind the regulatory chan-
ges. It also shows that Spanish regulatory history is similar to
that of other European countries, where control and regula-
tions were modest or non-existent in the nineteenth century
and then increased after the First World War and again after
the Second World War.
In the first section, the two theories of regulation and the
basic forms of policy intervention are briefly considered. The
paper turns next to examine the four different historical pe-
riods for which changes in the regulatory framework have
been identified, and asks what – over the long run – have been
the principal sources of regulation and supervision. In the last
section, some conclusions are drawn.
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2. The impetus for regulations and the forms of banking
supervision
As with other sectors, government intervention in banking
can be examined from the standpoint of the broader debate on
the role of government in an economy. Two theoretical approa-
ches compete to explain the historic cycles of financial regula-
tions, one based on the influence of public interest and the
other emphasizing the role of private interests1.
The public-interest viewpoint holds that governments re-
gulate banks to facilitate the efficient functioning of banks by
mitigating market failures for the benefit of broader civil so-
ciety. The public interest would be served if the banking system
allocated resources in a socially efficient manner and perfor-
med the other functions of finance competently: facilitating
payments, mobilizing savings, allocating capital, monitoring
managers, and providing the tools for the management and
trading of a variety of risks. Because banking crises are expen-
sive and can reduce growth and worsen income distribution,
their prevention is also often an explicit goal. Hence, regula-
tions are viewed as a means of reducing the probability of cri-
ses and of protecting agents against banking disasters.
In the private interest or political-economy approach, re-
gulations are viewed as a product, the allocation of which is
governed by laws of supply and demand. Although it accepts
the presence of market failures, regulations are conceived as
the outcome of the interplay between various suppliers and
demanders – in which particular interests with different objec-
tive functions and political influences compete to use the coer-
PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA, MARIA A. PONS, CONCEPCIÓN BETRÁN
38 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
1 Seminal works are Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Peltzam (1976). A good
synthesis of the two approaches is given in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004 and
2006). Historical contributions in White (1982), Kroszner and Strahan (1999),
and Hansen (2001).
02-martin-acena_35_82_02-martin-acena_35_82  13/03/15  09:44  Pagina 38
cive power of the state to appropriate yields. Groups with grea-
ter numbers, financial resources and cohesion will have an ad-
vantage in securing regulations that are favourable to them,
such as limiting competition. This approach also considers po-
liticians and regulators to be interest groups motivated by the
desire to advance a particular ideological agenda, and to ma-
ximize the desired majority vote.
Although these reasons for regulation are distinct, Gros-
sman (2010) points out that, in practice, it is difficult to disen-
tangle the multiple motivations behind a particular reform. In
some cases, it is relatively straightforward to identify the ti-
ming of the forces driving regulatory reforms; in others, it is
more complicated. History is more complex than theory. It is
thus plausible that, at times, a country´s regulatory choices
may be more consistent with the public interest viewpoint, and
at other times, with that of private interest. Kane (1997) argues
that the regulatory process is akin to a Hegelian dialectical
struggle, suggesting that continued oscillation is to be expec-
ted. The swings between the public – and the private – interest
approaches to regulation can take place with different frequen-
cies, and conceivably last for a long time, especially if the fac-
tors driving change reshape political constituencies.
To obtain their aims, governments typically intervene in
the banking sector in a variety of ways. Mishkin (2001) has li-
sted the nine basic instruments through which financial insti-
tutions have historically been controlled. These include:
– restrictions on asset holdings and activities;
– separation of the banking and other financial services in-
dustry;
– restrictions on competition;
– capital requirements;
– risk-based deposit insurance premia;
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– disclosure requirements;
– bank chartering;
– bank examination;
– a supervisory versus regulatory approach2.
Together, all these instruments provide a useful framework
to categorize the different historical regulatory cycles and also
facilitate cross-country comparisons with regard to how pru-
dential regulation and supervision has been applied. In what
follows, we will use this framework to categorize the four Spa-
nish regulatory regimes and to draw conclusions about the mo-
tives for regulation in each case3.
3. The liberal banking era, 1856-1920
The modern history of Spanish banking began in 1856,
when the Cortes (Spanish Parliament) approved the Bank of
Issue Law and the Credit Company Law, which established a
relatively open and liberal financial framework that, with
minor changes, remained in place over the next six decades4.
The Bank of Issue Law regulated the establishment and
operations of issue institutions. Incorporation required gover-
nment authorization, although this was easily obtained. Plu-
rality of issue was permitted, but limited to only one bank per
town. Capital had to be paid up entirely at the time of consti-
tution, and the maximum volume of currency banks could
issue was set as equal to three times the amount of paid-up ca-
pital. The law imposed a minimum ratio of coins to banknotes
in circulation, but there was no provision compelling banks to
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redeem their notes into specie on demand, and banks could en-
gage in all sorts of financial operations without restriction. Pu-
blication of monthly statements was mandatory. To supervise
bank operations, the government could appoint a Royal Com-
missioner for each institution5.
The Credit Company Law was less restrictive. According
to the liberal ideology of the time, banks were supposed to ope-
rate just as any other non-financial firm. Incorporation required
the previous approval of the government, but there were no
barriers to entry since the law did not set minimum capital re-
quirements. Banking transactions were not subject to any sort
of restrictions, the act imposed no cash or liquidity ratios.
Banks and credit societies could undertake all kinds of com-
mercial operations, no permission was needed to open bran-
ches in any region of the country and the only obligation of
credit companies was to send their balance sheets and income
and losses accounts to the Ministry of Finance, although no
standard accounting and disclosure norms existed. No super-
visory agency was created, but the government could at any
time examine the accounting books of companies and verify
the state of their cash holdings.
Simultaneously, a Royal order of 1835 established the bases
for the foundation of savings banks. Although their establi-
shment required the approval of the government, their orga-
nization and operations were subject to their own statutes.
They had no obligation to disclose information or to publish
their financial statements, and neither were they controlled by
any governmental regulatory or supervisory body. In 1853, the
Ministry of the Interior made an attempt to regulate and con-
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trol the thrift institutions. However, it failed due to strong op-
position from the founders and directors of these institutions6.
A remarkable financial expansion followed the approval of
these laws: sixty new banks opened and twenty two savings
banks were founded. This financial expansion was associated
with a parallel economic boom, led by the construction of the
railway system. The promoters of the railway companies were
the banks and credit societies founded after 1856. However, as
happened elsewhere, the expectations raised by the construc-
tion of the railways were excessively optimistic and beginning
in 1864, the stocks of the main railway companies plummeted
on the Paris Bourse. Mining equity prices and government debt
prices also fell. The financial crisis erupted in May 1866, the
same month that Overend and Gurney in London collapsed,
and the panic was particularly intense in Barcelona and Ma-
drid7.
The 1866 crisis was deep and damaging: financial and non-
financial companies went into liquidation, the number of joint-
stock banks fell and many private bankers and merchant
houses disappeared. Of the thirty seven financial institutions
founded after 1856, no more than twenty survived the crisis,
and of the eighty bankers and private finance houses officially
registered in 1866, there were only forty three in operation by
18708. Only savings banks, with no risky assets, remained un-
touched by the financial turmoil.
Although the crisis wiped out half of the banking system,
the financial authorities did not react. No measures were taken
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and the adjustment was left entirely to market discipline. A
laissez-faire policy was maintained, and both the Treasury and
the Bank of Spain let the crisis run its course9. Instead of intro-
ducing legislation to prevent similar crises in the future, the
Ministry of Finance maintained its liberal stance and the au-
thorities took further liberalization measures. In 1869, a new
Joint Stock Company Law lifted all restrictions on the creation
of banks of issue and credit companies. Entry into the sector
was entirely free and unrestricted, with the exception that only
one note-issuing bank could be opened in each town. Moreo-
ver, no regulatory or supervisory measures were adopted10.
Thus, after 1869, the features of the Spanish financial system
were similar to those that characterized the so-called “free ban-
king system” prevailing in some European countries and some
American states11.
There were four additional banking crises: in 1881-1882,
1890, and in 1913 and 191412. The 1881-1882 crisis caused the
failure of a considerable number of undercapitalized and badly
managed banks that had been opened in the previous decade.
The crash of 1890 coincided with the Baring Brother banking
house crisis. There were not as many failures as in the previous
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eliminate potential note-issuing competitors.
10 A minor measure had been taken in July 1865, when the government passed
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companies to compile financial statements (Bernal Lloréns, 2004 pp. 11-13).
11 It was certainly not a free banking system in its purest form, but it approa-
ched the well known cases of free banking in Scotland and the US studied by
White (1991, pp. 37-72) and Rockoff (1991, pp. 73-109). See also the papers in-
cluded in Capie and Wood (1991).
12 These years are also the approximate dates for international and economic
financial crises: Kindleberger (2000)); Schwartz, (1986), Neal and Weidenmier
(2003), Goodhart and Delargy (1998).
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crash, although banks with impaired assets were liquidated.
However, the overall financial structure was damaged and it
did not recover until the turn of the century13. As in the after-
math of 1866, these two episodes did not provoke any official
reaction, and no changes were introduced to alter the financial
framework or to prevent future trouble. Once again, no lender
of last-resort assistance was available, despite the fact that the
Bank of Spain had been granted the monopoly of issue in 1874,
from that point on becoming the only supplier of liquidity14.
The reform of the Commercial Code undertaken in 1885, con-
sistent with the “laissez faire, laissez passer” philosophy of the
times, maintained free entry into the industry and did not im-
pose any limitation on banks’ operations and activities. The
sole obligation for banks was to publish the balance sheets and
the income and losses account in the official state and provin-
cial gazettes15.
Although thrift institutions weathered the crises better than
the banks, the Ministry of the Interior introduced legislation to
regulate the creation and the scope of savings banks. According
to the Savings Banks Law enacted in 1880, the foundation of
thrift institutions remained open to individuals and institu-
tions but their statutes had to be approved by the government.
However, the thrifts remained essentially unregulated, under
the loose supervision of the Ministry of the Interior16.
There were two more critical episodes before the First
World War: one in 1913, which affected the Banco Hispano-
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stem. Fifteen banks of issue merged with the Bank of Spain (Anes, 1974, pp.
130-135).
15 Faus (2001), pp. 62-66.
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Americano, a large financial institution, and the other in 1914
immediately following the outbreak of the war. Although in
both instances the Bank of Spain provided lender-of-last-resort
assistance for the first time, hastily and in response to pressure
from the Ministry of Finance, the prevailing lax regulatory re-
gime remained unaltered17.
The main features of the Spanish regulatory framework
over the 150-year period encompassed by our study are sum-
marized in the Appendix. The first column displays the nine
forms of regulation, while the other columns show their cha-
racteristics. As elsewhere, the early form of entry regulation
was through chartering. The trend towards liberalization
began in 1856 and, as in Britain after 1844, the nineteenth cen-
tury legislation that followed was of a liberalizing nature18.
The banking codes were superseded in 1869 when the enact-
ment of a general company law greatly simplified incorpora-
tion for all kinds of banking and non-banking joint-stock
firms19. Neither the laws of 1856 nor the institutional reforms
introduced thereafter in 1869 and 1885 imposed restrictions
on banks’ operations or limited their scope or their scale. Sa-
vings banks also operated quite unrestrictedly during most of
the nineteenth century, subject only to their own statutes. Note
issue was centralized in 1874, although free entry for non-
issue commercial banks prevailed uninterrupted until 1920.
Disclosure requirements were lax and not always complied
with. Although financial crises were not uncommon, the go-
vernment did not react by changing the regulatory frame-
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(Grossman 2010, p. 143).
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work20. Moreover, the commercial banks were too small and
geographically dispersed to be able to form coalitions in order
to ask for any sort of financial regulation or rules to enforce
some degree of prudential supervision21.
Behind the liberal banking codes of 1856 and the general
company law of 1869 lay political economy motivations. The
laissez-faire economic philosophy and environment of mid-ni-
neteenth-century Europe permeated all the economic legisla-
tion of the epoch and forestalled any possible reactive action
to the financial crises. Legislation to guarantee financial stabi-
lity seems not to have been on the agenda of the public autho-
rities, nor in the minds of those who would have been the
potential beneficiaries. The influence of ideology was thus pa-
ramount. However, the liberal reformers of the time also aimed
at promoting the development of the financial system, and
hence designed initial banking legislation to facilitate the esta-
blishment of banks and savings banks, as in fact happened
after the banking laws were approved. The nineteenth century
history of Spanish banking demonstrates the interplay between
economic and political economy forces.
4. Financial self-regulation in the interwar period,
1921-1936
The interwar period was a turning point for banking regu-
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lation in many countries. In Denmark (1919), Austria (1924-
1925), Czechoslovakia (1924), Norway (1925), Portugal (1925),
Italy (1926) and Japan (1927), legislative acts were approved in
response to the turbulence caused by the end of the war boom.
The financial crises of the Great Depression intensified, acce-
lerating the adoption of banking legislation in Germany (1931-
1934), Switzerland (1934), Italy again (1936) and the United
States (1933-1934)22. In France, although a specific banking law
was not enacted until 1941, government intervention in the fi-
nancial sector increased23. Spain was no exception to this trend.
The outbreak of the war in 1914 marked the beginning of a
period of uncertainty. However, as the country had remained
neutral, confidence returned, the economy experienced steady
growth and banking activities expanded24. The financial sy-
stem made a move towards universal banking. The involve-
ment of banks in industrial promotion made them vulnerable
to fluctuations in the earning potential and equity value of the
manufacturing firms with which they maintained relations.
Since banks made commercial loans against industrial securi-
ties deposited as collateral, their loan portfolios became highly
vulnerable to variations in stock prices25.
Just as the war ended, a banking crisis broke out. There
were runs on deposits in various institutions throughout the
country and confidence in the financial system was shaken. As
with other continental European nations, the postwar financial
crisis brought to the fore the lack of a regulatory framework,
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and the events of 1920 raised serious concerns in the Treasury
as to the adequacy of the financial legal framework. Moreover,
bank directors and owners had been expressing concerns about
the “lack of regulation” of the banking industry since 1910.
They complained about the unfair competition of the savings
banks and protested about the intrusion of unprofessional “se-
cond-rate financiers” who could freely open small banks and
finance houses without minimum capital bases and guaran-
tees. They promoted the creation of regional banking associa-
tions, and in 1918 formed the Comité Central de la Banca
Española (Central Spanish Bank Committee). Two years later,
the Federation asked for the adoption of some kind of regula-
tory regime26. This informal attempt at self-regulation demon-
strates that the banking community was interested in financial
stability. Standardized and reliable accounting practices and
disclosure would make it possible to discriminate between sol-
vent, well-managed institutions and those with poor and risky
assets, weak balance sheets and unclear profit and loss ac-
counts. They also aimed to create some kind of cartel to curtail
excessive competition. Cooperation was seen as a way to en-
sure public confidence and reduce the probability of financial
panics.
Simultaneously, a committee was appointed to prepare a
project to regulate and reorganize the banking system and to
transform the Bank of Spain into a real central bank27. The re-
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form came in 1921 with the Ley de Ordenación Bancaria (The
Banking Regulation Law), which aimed to establish certain
controls on banking operations and close supervision of the
banks’ activities. A relevant feature was the establishment of
the Consejo Superior Bancario (Supreme Banking Council-
SBC), entrusted with broad regulatory and supervisory po-
wers28. It could set minimum capital requirements as well as
limits on pricing and fixed maximum rates for current accounts
and deposits. The Council could also establish the proportio-
nality between different items of the banks’ balance sheets,
such as the ratio between total earning assets and short-term
liabilities, and the ratio of total deposits to paid-up capital plus
reserves29. The law compelled banks to submit monthly ba-
lance-sheet statements to the SBC and to publish their income
statements. Moreover, the SBC was responsible for designing
the model of the balance sheet and of the income and losses
account, representing a step forward in increasing the banks’
transparency and accountability. The SBC was also empowe-
red to investigate bank operations and accounts and to impose
disciplinary sanctions, and an official or public Banking Re-
cord Office was established under the auspices of the Council.
Registration was free until 1927, but was nevertheless required
to gain access to the special discount facility in the Bank of
Spain.
Savings banks soon reacted to the establishment of the SBC
– they had already participated in a number of national confe-
rences organized in 1904 and in 1914. Although aiming to con-
solidate their social role, the directors of the savings banks
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were more inclined to cooperate than commercial banks, and
between 1910 and 1920, the savings institutions set up several
regional associations to defend their interests and reduce the
competition between them. In 1920, the thrifts were placed
under the surveillance of the Ministry of Labor. All savings
banks were compelled to register in a registration office and an
inspectorate service was created. In exchange for the protective
shield of the Ministry, they lost part of their autonomy and
were compelled to invest a certain proportion of their funds in
public debt as well to increase their mortgage lending. In 1926,
the counterpart of the bankers’ SBC was established: the Con-
federación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (Confederation of
Spanish Savings Banks)30.
The 1921 banking law and the SBC did not prevent the re-
appearance of a new wave of banking failures. In 1924, the dif-
ficulties re-emerged. The new crisis appeared as a continuous
run on bank deposits, which lasted nearly a year, until Septem-
ber 1925. During 1924-1926 half a dozen salient banks failed
and were forced to liquidate31. The year 1931 was also compli-
cated for Spain: although the Great Depression was less severe
in Spain than elsewhere in Europe, the spring of 1931 was po-
litically complex and financially unstable32. The demise of the
Monarchy, the proclamation of the Second Republic and the
formation of a coalition government with various socialist mi-
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pression on Spain in Banco de España (1934). For the Spanish economy during
the nineteen thirties, see Hernández Andreu (1980), Palafox (1980 and 2011),
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nisters brought anxiety and fear to the business community
and to the public in general. News of the failure of the Credi-
tanstalt and of the difficulties of Central European institutions
also contributed to darkening the atmosphere. The crisis erup-
ted in April 1931, with an intense run on banks between April
and June. The removal of funds continued throughout the
summer until the end of September, when the crisis blew over.
In the meantime, the total volume of deposits had declined by
20 per cent of the total outstanding in March 193133.
Spanish banks did not fail because they were able to obtain
all the cash they needed to convert deposits into currency. Two
reasons may help us to understand what made this possible.
Firstly, for the first time the Bank of Spain was ready to behave
as a lender of last resort; secondly, banks had plenty of liquid
assets. When the run started, the Bank of Spain and the Trea-
sury agreed to take combined action to provide all the cash
banks might need. The government authorized an increase in
the total of banknotes in circulation, and the bank directors
agreed to lend freely, discounting bills on demand and accep-
ting eligible paper as collateral for credit34.
In 1931, the banking law was amended, although the amen-
dment was not in reaction to the financial crisis35 but was rather
aimed at increasing the Government’s control of the Bank of
Spain. The reform was a response to the non-collaborative stance
of the Bank in the attempt by the government to defend the ex-
change rate of the peseta. The Bank refused to side with the Trea-
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sury and commit its huge gold reserves to contain the deprecia-
tion of the currency. The government was convinced that the
Board of the Bank preferred to safeguard the property of its sha-
reholders (the gold reserves), rather than to co-operate with the
centre-left Republican government, and firmly believed that the
non-compliance of the Bank was politically motivated36.
The savings bank regulatory framework was first modified
in 1929 with the “Estatuto del Ahorro” (Savings Statue), and
in 1933 with the “Estatuto de las Cajas de Ahorro Popular”
(Statute of the Popular Savings Banks). In neither of these two
cases did the changes come as a consequence of financial diffi-
culties. It was rather an attempt by the government to control
the thrifts by submitting them to its policy objectives37.
The Appendix summarizes the characteristics of the super-
visory regime of the interwar period. The reform of 1921 was
a reaction to the banking instability of the previous two years
that had threatened the public’s confidence in banks. However,
the regulatory structure remained lax, despite the introduction
of some prudential rules, such as minimum capital, bank regi-
stration, and some asset-to-liability ratios. There were only mo-
dest changes in the practice of bank supervision. Some
improvements with respect to the previous period included the
obligation of banks to send their financial statements to the Su-
preme Banking Council. The design of a common balance sheet
for all banks increased transparency. Bank examination, al-
though still limited, experienced a minor advance.
The analysis of the regulatory process that led to the Bank
Act of 1921 and its amendment in 1931 demonstrates that the
outcome was a mixture of public and private interests. The pu-
PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA, MARIA A. PONS, CONCEPCIÓN BETRÁN
52 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
36 The Spanish monetary and exchange-rate policy in Martín-Aceña (1983),
chap. 6.
37 Forniés (1989); Comín (2007).
02-martin-acena_35_82_02-martin-acena_35_82  13/03/15  09:44  Pagina 52
blic interest was served by the 1921 act because prudential
measures concerning capital and liquidity requirements as well
as the provisions regarding the disclosure of balance sheets and
annual profit-and-loss accounts increased transparency and in
principle diminished the likelihood of future failures. These re-
gulatory changes also affected the Bank of Spain. In this in-
stance, the goal of the government was to transform the
institution into a real central bank that could better serve the
general economic interests of the nation.
The private interest was also present, since the banks and the
savings banks were able to demarcate a clear line, beyond which
control of the system and of the individual institutions remained
in their hands. The Supreme Banking Council and the CECA
were established to defend the interests of their affiliates. They
could place restraints on competition if necessary, and impose
norms on the financial community. Both organizations served to
protect their members from unwarranted state control and su-
pervisory competences remained in their hands, as did the power
to impose penalties on members who did not comply with the
rules. Between no regulation at all and government control, ban-
kers and patrons of savings banks preferred self-regulation.
5. Interventionism and regulation, 1939-1975
From the end of World War II until the demise of the Bret-
ton Woods system, financial regulation became more intense
and widespread, both at national and international levels. Even
in the UK, where there had been little statutory regulation from
1870 to 1945, the picture changed after 194538. Throughout
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most of the 1950s and 1960s, the authorities determined and
constrained the direction of lending, which was primarily di-
rected at large industrial companies, with implicit government
support. There was very little call for any supervisory or regu-
latory activity, and those few cases where the central banks
were asked to help always involved a mixture of liquidity and
solvency problems39.
Once again, Spain was no exception to this general trend.
After the Civil War and up until the 1970s, there were relatively
few banking failures and banks and savings banks in difficulty
were systematically rescued by the Bank of Spain. Mergers and
acquisitions of banks in trouble by sound banks, with the fiscal
support and under the auspices of the supervisory authorities,
were the alternatives used to avoid bankruptcies40. The number
of banks increased in the second half of the 1940s, but then fell
steadily until 1962. This decline was the result of a strong con-
solidation movement, whereby big national banks bought small
local and provincial banks. Thereafter, a wave of financial con-
solidation led to new reductions in the number of institutions41.
The autarkic and interventionist orientation of the early
years of the Franco regime prompted the imposition of struc-
tural controls and a shift in bank supervision away from mar-
ket discipline towards government discretion. Financial
stability and government-oriented resource allocation rather
than competition became the priority of the authorities. First,
a decree in 1939 imposed a so-called banking “statu quo”
which prohibited the establishment of new financial institu-
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tions without prior government scrutiny and approval. A few
years later, in 1946, the old banking act was replaced by a new
and more restrictive one42.
The Banking Regulatory Law of 1946 contained a veritable
litany of regulations43: the Ministry of Finance received discre-
tionary powers to grant or deny bank charters and entry was
at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance, which used its au-
thority rather arbitrarily. A new Banking Record Office was
established. Only existing banks were allowed to register and
to continue in the industry. A bank’s capital structure, its po-
tential earnings, its management and the convenience and
needs of the community were the elements considered by the
new regulators before approving the establishment of a new
bank. In addition, a favourable report from the Supreme Ban-
king Council, also under the control of the government, was
required. Branch expansion depended on the financial density
of each region, the existence of unserved financial demand or
well-proven insufficient financial services. The concession of
branches was linked to the volume of capital and reserves of
each bank; thus, the larger the bank the higher the likelihood
it had of obtaining authorization to open a new branch.
The Ministry set maximum and minimum interest rates on
deposits and on loans, and also set preferential rates for the so-
called “priority industrial sectors”. All banking operations
were subject to controls: in accordance with the portfolio re-
strictions, only discounting and short-term commercial loans
with ninety days’ maturity were authorized, and long-term
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credit was severely restricted until 1960. Quantitative credit
ceilings were imposed, according to the industrial policy of the
government. Variations in nominal or paid-up capital, reserve
provisions, dividend distribution and exchanges and acquisi-
tions of shares among financial institutions were all subject to
ministerial approval. Disclosure rules were also established,
and banks had to permit on-site inspections at the authorities’
discretion.
The state’s intervention was even more pronounced with
regard to savings banks44. Under the close surveillance of the
Ministry of Labour, the thrifts lost all of their remaining auto-
nomy. While there were no relevant legislative changes, the go-
vernments of the time were able to impose their will by
controlling the boards of directors of the institutions. Savings
banks were forced to invest most of their resources in public
debt and to channel what was left into selected economic sec-
tors or social goals decided by the Ministry of Labour. Interest
rates were officially set, as well as the type of financial opera-
tions savings banks could engage in. To a large extent, thrifts
were almost transformed into government financial agencies,
but to compensate for this extreme interventionism they were
allowed to expand in number and open branches throughout
the national territory45.
The architecture of financial regulation was simplified.
Until 1957, the main supervisory agency for banks had been
the Ministry of Finance, while for savings banks it had been
Ministry of Labour: now, however, the former was also made
responsible for thrift institutions. Hence, Spain opted for a sin-
gle supervisory agency, as was the case in many other Euro-
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pean countries, e.g. Italy. The Supreme Banking Council esta-
blished in 1921 remained in place, although with reduced su-
pervisory duties and limited autonomy. It acted as a consulting
agency for the Ministry of Finance; other functions included
receiving applications for the establishment of new banks and
for the opening of new branches and the collection of bank sta-
tistics. It housed a Supervisory Board (Junta de Vigilancia) with
the task of enforcing official policy and the banks’ compliance
with all official regulations.
In 1962, the regulatory framework was partially altered.
Changes in the European financial environment and the exhau-
stion of the domestic expansionary cycle that had begun in
1951 convinced the government that the previous autarkic and
interventionist strategy ought to be dismantled. The Spanish
economy grew rapidly throughout most of the 1950s, but at the
same time it accumulated a series of fiscal and monetary im-
balances that threatened to abruptly halt past economic gains.
Protectionism and interventionism had also led to gross indu-
strial inefficiencies and misallocation of resources. Thus, in
1959, a Stabilization Plan modeled after a similar French plan
was adopted to correct the inflationary process and the moun-
ting disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The plan was
followed by a series of reforms aimed at dismantling the au-
tarkic framework, reducing state participation in the economy,
and enhancing the role of the market46.
The old banking law was replaced in 1962 by a new Ban-
king and Credit Regulatory Law. The Bank of Spain was natio-
nalized and old and new monetary instruments were put in
place. The law established cash and liquidity ratios and a new
public-debt ratio, by which banks were required to hold a cer-
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tain proportion of government securities in their portfolio. Re-
serve requirements were also introduced for both banks and
savings banks. Another relevant change was the separation
between commercial and industrial banks47.
However, the liberalizing winds of the 1962 law took time
to materialize. Entry barriers persisted for banks and savings
bank, branch limitations remained in place and the interest-
rate ceiling on deposits and loans continued to be under strict
government control. Since financial institutions were supposed
to play an active role in promoting industrialization, a so-called
“investment coefficient” was introduced, whereby banks and
savings banks were compelled to maintain a certain proportion
of their portfolio in government bonds or in pre-determined
industrial securities. In addition, “preferential” interest rates
were adopted to favour the development of industrial sectors
considered of “national interest”.
Beginning in 1969, deregulation accelerated48. Interest-rate
restrictions on long-term (two years or more) loans were lifted.
Barriers to entry were relaxed and branch restrictions were
partially removed. These more lenient chartering and branch
policies enhanced competition. After 1974, deregulation spee-
ded up still further. Discrimination between banks and savings
banks were eliminated, banking operations were liberalized
and the obstacles to competition among financial institutions
were progressively suppressed. The 1974 financial reforms
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sought to improve financial efficiency and monetary control
through three basic elements: measures to increase interbank
competition; regulations to promote competition among dif-
ferent types of intermediaries; and the liberalization of all
long-term interest rates49. The public or official banking system
was also restructured. It had been plagued by economic inef-
ficiencies because of politically orientated credit allocation pro-
cesses to preferential customers; moreover, fraudulent
practices were not uncommon. Consequently, a major piece of
legislation, the Official Credit Act of 1971, attempted to ratio-
nalize the internal organization and the performance of the pu-
blic banks by depoliticizing their credit allocation
mechanisms50. As in the two previous sections, the Appendix
summarizes the main reforms and regulatory features of the
period.
The Spanish financial regulatory regime built after the civil
war, not very different from that adopted in other European
nations, offers a remarkable contrast with that of the previous
two periods. Competition was sacrificed for stability. The go-
vernment, showing an unmistakable distrust of bankers and
no faith in the market, replaced the role of the market in the al-
location and distribution of resources. After 1962, deregulation
made some inroads. The reforms introduced in 1962, and still
more intensively after 1969, were not consequences either of
banks’ failures or threats to the stability of the financial struc-
tures: in both cases, the regulatory changes reflected other mo-
tivations.
Banking regulations were the result of a combination of
economic factors (government interest in industrialization) and
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of political economy motives (the private interest, ideology, in-
stitutions).The main economic goal was to change the alloca-
tion of resources to foster economic growth, and banks were
used as an instrument of forced industrialization and as a
means of obtaining cheap public financing. In return, the go-
vernment offered banks advantages to secure their collabora-
tion. Political motives were also present. The restrictions and
controls of the 1940s and 1950s reflected the ideology of the
Franco regime as well as an obvious political goal: that of re-
taining power and gaining support by distributing benefits to
selected groups (the bankers). Banks were able to capture the
policy-making apparatus and thus obtain extremely favourable
financial regulations. Likewise, deregulation stemmed from si-
milar motives: it took place when it was politically advantage-
ous to deliver economic development in order to maintain
power and the continued survival of the regime. Political ra-
ther than economic factors determined the timing and the pace
of reforms. Moreover, the Franco regime initiated financial de-
regulation in the late 1960s because it confronted a new set of
economic and political constraints that reduced the attractive-
ness of restriction51.
6. Banking crises and financial reforms, 1975-2000.
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, financial
crises returned with a vengeance to the world scenario. In
many countries, the crises had their origin in a previous cycle
characterized by excessive real-estate investment, rapid credit
expansion and exceptional increases in asset prices. A permis-
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sive factor was the domestic financial liberalization that had
begun in the late 1970s and was completed by the late 1980s.
When the booms ended, insolvency led to bankruptcies and
widespread financial instability. Having dismantled the safe-
guards provided by the postwar structural controls and not yet
having set in place the new prudential instruments, the autho-
rities were taken aback and forced to design a new architecture
of financial regulation, a task which would be carried out in
the 1980s and that took time to implement52.
In Spain, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the most severe
financial crisis since the crash of 1866. Twenty-four institutions
were rescued, four were liquidated, four merged, and twenty
small and medium-sized banks were nationalized. All in all,
fifty two banks out of a hundred and ten, accounting for nearly
25 per cent of the system’s deposits, disappeared53. Savings
banks also went through difficult times, although in this case
consolidation was the solution adopted to prevent major ban-
kruptcies. In many instances, insolvent small and medium-size
savings banks were absorbed by larger and better managed in-
stitutions54.
A combination of exogenous and endogenous factors lay be-
hind the causes of the banking crisis55. In the mid-1970s, the sta-
ble macroeconomic environment of the previous decade came
to an end. Energy and raw material and labour costs rose. The
balance of payments on current account deteriorated, inflation
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escalated and nominal interest rates increased. Unemployment
rose to record levels of up to 25 per cent. The industrial sector
was also severely hit: technical obsolescence, lack of competiti-
veness and dependence on external finance put industrial com-
panies in a difficult situation. Banks caught with large industrial
portfolios saw their balance sheets deteriorate. The volume of
non-performing assets rose, banks’ profits were reduced and in
some cases losses were recorded, although they were not publi-
cly unveiled. Equity prices fell sharply, as did housing and com-
mercial real estate prices after several years of a pronounced
upward trend, supported by high borrowing levels56.
The end of the “statu quo” and the dismantling of the struc-
tural controls after 1962 was ill prepared and poorly conducted.
The separation between commercial and investment banks fai-
led, the paid-up capital required to establish new credit institu-
tions was set at very low levels and plans for opening branches
displayed no economic sense, leading to an excessive number
of agencies. Many banks had expanded into geographical and
business areas in which they had little prior knowledge. Indu-
strial banks opened after 1962 lacked expertise and qualified
professionals. Bank managers were not used to operating in a
competitive environment and increased their focus on gaining
market share. Problems accumulated as a consequence of un-
dercapitalization, risk concentration over the legal limits, high
leverage to sustain uncompetitive firms under the control of the
bank and unorthodox accounting methods to hide solvency dif-
ficulties, if not outright illegal financial operations57.
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As the banking crisis erupted almost unexpectedly, the Mi-
nistry of Finance and the Bank of Spain were caught unprepa-
red. Deregulation had not been accompanied by the
establishment of an efficient system of banking supervision,
and the authorities had neither the legal instruments nor the
institutional mechanisms to face the turmoil caused by the
banks’ massive insolvencies. Although the Bank of Spain had
assumed since 1971 all functions with regard to the inspection
of all credit institutions (except the state-owned banks), the in-
spection department of the Bank lacked the human capacity to
carry out adequate banking examination. Disclosure require-
ments for financial holdings were not in place and hence it was
difficult to gauge the solvency of the financial firms within the
holding. Auditing of banks was not a widespread custom at
the time and many firms resisted inspection by outsiders. Pro-
cedure rules to impose sanctions on managers or to remove the
administrators of banks in trouble were legally complicated,
outdated or non-existent. To avoid a catastrophe, the Bank had
to implement emergency measures to prevent bank runs and
a contagion effect from unsound to essentially solvent institu-
tions. Containment included lender-of-last-resort assistance to
banks with temporary liquidity problems and intervention in
basically failed banks.
To provide limited guarantees to depositors, two Deposit
Guarantee Funds (one for banks and another for savings
banks) were established in November 1977. Rescue operations
began in 1978 and continued well into 1983. In addition, a new
institution was set up: the Corporación Bancaria (Banking Cor-
poration), a private joint-stock company that received contri-
butions from the Bank of Spain and from nearly one hundred
banking firms. The Corporation proved to be a quick and ade-
quate mechanism for intervening in banks in trouble, removing
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and substituting the administrators, reorganizing the banks,
and in due time, returning them to the private sector. In 1980,
the Deposit Guarantee Funds were reorganized, replacing the
Banking Corporation and being given additional power and
financial muscle. The Fund intervened in twenty nine institu-
tions, only one of which was liquidated, while the rest were re-
structured, reorganized, and later sold to other banks. In one
case of a major industrial bank, the intervention was conducted
directly by the Bank of Spain. The Ministry of Finance also in-
tervened directly in another special case: the nationalization of
the Rumasa holding, formed by 600 commercial and industrial
firms and seventeen banks.
The crisis taught important policy lessons, and the regula-
tors moved swiftly to implement a strong banking supervisory
regime58. First, they realized that bank regulatory and super-
visory agencies needed adequate resources to do their job ef-
fectively. Second, they also realized that proper accounting
standards and disclosure requirements were crucial to a heal-
thy banking system. Third, bank supervisors needed to take
prompt action to stop undesirable bank activities, and even
close down institutions that did not have sufficient net worth,
making sure that stockholders and managers of these insolvent
institutions were appropriately punished. Fourth, because
prompt corrective action was so important, the bank supervi-
sory agency would require sufficient independence from the
political process to ensure that it was not encouraged to sweep
problems under the rug by engaging in regulatory forbearance.
As the crisis unfolded, legislation was passed in order to
reinforce the supervisory capacity of the Bank of Spain. In 1980,
the Ley de Organos Rectores del Banco de España (Law of Go-
verning Bodies of the Bank of Spain) transferred all responsi-
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bilities for bank supervision, discipline and sanctions to the
central bank, which at the same time was given ample political
autonomy. A short time thereafter, the Bank, by means of mi-
nisterial orders or by mere communications, introduced new
rules regulating accounting practices and disclosure norms
with regard to the income-and-losses account. Spanish mem-
bership of the then European Community after 1986 was an
additional incentive for intensifying the reforms and impro-
ving the supervisory framework and the capacity and perfor-
mance of the institutions in charge of the tasks, in most cases
the central banks. In 1988, the Credit Company Intervention
and Discipline Law unified the control of all financial firms
under the Bank of Spain. The law regulated the causes for bank
intervention, enumerated the possible infringements, establi-
shed the standard procedures for banking examination and li-
sted the sanctions for banks and managers according to the
severity of the misdemeanour. The following step came with
the Autonomy of the Bank of Spain Law in1994, enacted in
order to comply with EU legislation. Finally, in 2000, the Bank
of Spain introduced the so-called forward-looking provisio-
ning, also referred to as the dynamic or statistical reserve, a me-
chanism of pre-provisioning for loan losses over the course of
the cycle. From the moment that a loan is granted, and before
any impairment in this specific loan appears, there is a positive
default probability (no matter how low it might be) following
a statistical distribution with an expected loss. As the risk ap-
pears at the beginning of the operation, so does the statistical
operation requirement. With this system, provisions run in pa-
rallel to revenues and are, therefore, distributed through the
cycle, allowing for better mapping between income and costs
in the profit and loss account59. A summary of the main featu-
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res of the regulatory regime for these years is also given in the
Appendix.
The regulatory changes approved in the 1980s and 1990s
were a direct product of the banking crisis that had been un-
folding since 197760. The authorities took further steps in the
liberalizing drive to increase the level of competition within
the system with the belief that it would enhance efficiency and
better banking management practices. On this occasion, the de-
regulation process was accompanied by the adoption of an
array of measures to put into place a coherent and powerful
mechanism for prudential supervision. The reforms also re-
sponded to a genuine interest on the part of policy makers in
updating the Spanish economy, aligning it with the European
market system, promoting growth and competition and ma-
king a complete break with the inward-looking financial and
economic strategy of the Franco years. The private interest was
also present, because the regulatory reforms introduced after
1975 responded to politicians´ conviction that market-based fi-
nancial systems provided superior economic performance. De-
mocratization changed the reward structure confronting
leaders, making the supply of public goods, such as strong eco-
nomic performance and financial monetary stability, more at-
tractive while a narrow defence of special interests became less
tenable. Spain´s democracy gave politicians an incentive to di-
smantle the credit, entry, and interest rate controls that had tra-
ditionally been used to provide benefits to select groups,
instead promoting efficiency by giving market forces greater
reign61.
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7. Conclusion
As in the rest of the world, Spain has undergone periodic
changes in its regulatory framework. On various occasions, re-
gulatory changes have predated a financial crisis, while on
others, financial reforms have represented a reaction to the oc-
currence of a banking crisis. Public policy was usually absent
in the nineteenth century, whereas in the twentieth century, re-
gulators have been more active. Moreover, the Spanish expe-
rience is similar to that of other European countries, where
control and regulations were modest or non-existent in the ni-
neteenth century and then increased after the First World War
and again after the Second World War.
Until 1914, legislation reflected the liberal ideology of the
times. Behind the banking codes of 1856 and the general com-
pany law of 1869 lay purely political-economy motivations.
The laissez-faire economic philosophy of mid-nineteenth cen-
tury Europe permeated all the economic legislation of the
epoch and forestalled any possible reactive action to financial
crises. However, the liberal reformers of the time also aimed at
promoting the development of the financial system, and hence
designed initial banking legislation to facilitate the establi-
shment of banks and savings banks, as in fact happened after
the banking codes were approved.
The postwar banking crisis brought to the fore the need to
regulate the financial sector. The 1921 Banking Regulatory Law
was to some extent a watershed, because it signaled the end of
a long period of nearly “free banking”. Supervision was entru-
sted to the Supreme Banking Council, a new agency which was
controlled by the banks themselves. The civil war marked an
abrupt shift in the regulatory regime. Legislation introduced
in 1939-1942 and later in 1946 imposed strict barriers to entry
and restricted new branches. The lack of faith in the market led
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to arbitrary administrative allocation of resources and banks
were placed at the service of political-economy goals, as defi-
ned by the financial authorities. Protected from competition
within the industry and from outside, the banking industry en-
joyed a long period of relative stability. Liquidity problems
were resolved by the Bank of Spain in individual cases, and
bank insolvencies were dealt with by merging operations.
The regulatory regime was altered in 1962 as part of a ge-
neral shift from an inward-looking to an outward-looking
growth strategy. A new act mitigated the interventionism of
the previous period and introduced a division between com-
mercial and industrial or investment banks. Liberalization
began in 1969 and accelerated after 1974. However, deregula-
tion was not accompanied by a change in the supervisory re-
gime. During the favourable economic environment of the
1960s, the financial industry expanded considerably, but when
the world economic cycle changed in the mid-1970s, Spain was
severely hit by the crisis and suffered a long and protracted pe-
riod of financial turmoil. The supervisory authorities had to
implement emergency measures to contain a generalized col-
lapse. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, the supervisory regime was
reinforced and measures were introduced to comply with EU
directives and the Basel accords.
One conclusion of this paper is that Spanish financial re-
forms over the last 150 years have not always been reactive.
Until 1914, the regulatory modifications were not a response
to crises, and nor were those implemented after the civil war
or in 1962. In contrast, the act of 1921 and the regulatory re-
forms of the 1980s were clearly a reaction to banking crises. A
second conclusion is that the regulatory process has always
been the result of the interplay between public and private in-
terests. Economic and political-economy forces have together
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comprised the driving force that explains the timing and the
character of the Spanish financial reforms of the last 150 years.
Although our paper comes to an end before the present fi-
nancial crisis emerged, a final conclusion is that, obviously, the
regulatory and supervisory norms adopted in the late twen-
tieth century have not been sufficient, or efficient enough, to
prevent the occurrence of a new and severe banking crisis,
which is mainly affecting the savings-bank sector. The best that
can be said is that at least some measures, especially the so-cal-
led statistical reserves, may have served to mitigate the impact
of global turmoil on the Spanish financial fabric. Without the
reforms implemented in the eighties and nineties, the combi-
nation of the international banking crisis, the excessive expo-
sure of the building sector and the poor governance of too
many institutions would have provoked a predictable collapse
of the national banking system. In fact, the repetition of finan-
cial crises and the multi-causality of their origins suggest that,
in Spain as well as in many other countries, it has been impos-
sible until now to devise a regulatory framework capable of
preventing banking crises. Because as Díaz-Alejandro (1985)
remarked: “there is no humanly possible way of devising a fail-
proof system of finding out the true intentions of borrowers”.
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Appendix - Spanish Bank Supervisory Regimes
PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA, MARIA A. PONS, CONCEPCIÓN BETRÁN
70 THE JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
TABLE 1
Banks
Prudential
regulations
First Period:
1856-1920
Second Period:
1921-1936
Third Period:
1939-1975
Fourth period:
1975-2000
1. Entry Only one bank of is-
sue per town (1874:
monopoly of issue
granted to the Bank
of Spain).
Incorporation requi-
red government au-
thorization. Obtained
easily with minimum
requirements.
Subject to gover-
nment authorization
and a favourable re-
port from the Supre-
me Banking Council.
Compulsory registra-
tion in the Official Re-
gister of the SBC.
Restriction on entry.
Entry subject to strict
norms and regula-
tions.
Subject to authoriza-
tion by the Bank of
Spain.
2. Capital
requirements
Fixed minimum. Fixed minimum. Regulated. Fixed by
the Ministry of Finan-
ce.
Regulated until 1986
by the Bank of Spain.
After 1986, regulated
according to EU and
Basel rules.
3. Limits on
economies
of scale
No limits. No limits. Strong branching li-
mits. Strict controls
on mergers and con-
solidation.
No limits.
4. Limits on
economies of
scope and
diversification
Banks of issue: some
restrictions.
Credit companies: no
limits.
No limits. Restriction on portfo-
lio composition.
No restrictions.
5. Limits
on pricing
No limits. Maximum rates on
deposits.
Strict regulation by
the Ministry of Finan-
ce. All rates.
No restrictions.
6. Liability
insurance
No liability insuran-
ce.
No liability insuran-
ce.
No liability insuran-
ce.
Liability insurance in
place.
7. Disclosure Publication of finan-
cial statements in the
Official State Gazet-
te.
Information disclosu-
re to the Supreme
Banking Council.
Information disclosu-
re to the Ministry of
Finance.
Obligatory disclosure
rules.
8. Examination At the discretion of
the government.
Supreme Banking
Council. Rarely con-
ducted.
At the discretion of
the government. Exa-
mination by the Ge-
neral Inspectorate
Committee.
Close supervision and
examination by the
Bank of Spain.
9. Supervision and
enforcement
Royal commissioner.
Limited to complian-
ce with the statutes.
Limited to observan-
ce of the rules esta-
blished by the Su-
preme Banking Coun-
cil.
Strict enforcement of
rules. Repeal of the
bank charter in case
of violation of the law.
Strict enforcement of
bank regulations.
Strict supervision by
the Bank of Spain.
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TABLE 2
Savings Banks
Prudential
regulations
First Period:
1856-1920
Second Period:
1921-1936
Third Period:
1939-1975
Fourth period:
1975-2000
1. Entry Free entry. Minimal
discretion. The statu-
tes required the ap-
proval of the Ministry
of the Interior.
Unchanged. Similar to banks. Subject to the autho-
rization of the Bank
of Spain.
2. Capital
requirements
Regulated until 1986
by the Bank of Spain.
After 1986, regulated
according to EU and
Basel rules.
3. Limits on
economies
of scale
One savings bank per
town.
Unchanged. Strict branching limits. No limits.
4. Limits on
economies of
scope and
diversification
Restriction on assets. Unchanged. Restrictions on assets. No restrictions.
5. Limits
on pricing
Unregulated. Unregulated. Strict government re-
gulation.
No restrictions.
6. Liability
insurance
No liability insuran-
ce.
No liability insuran-
ce.
No liability insuran-
ce.
Liability insurance in
place.
7. Disclosure Unregulated. Unregulated. Disclosure to the Mi-
nistry of Labor and
later to the Ministry
of Finance.
Obligatory disclosure
rules.
8. Examination Unregulated. Unregulated. Similar to banks. Exa-
mination performed
by special agencies
established to regu-
late savings banks.
Close supervision and
examination by the
Bank of Spain.
9. Supervision and
enforcement
Unregulated. Unregulated.
After the approval of
the General Statute
of Savings Banks, su-
pervision was con-
ducted by the Mini-
stry of Labor.
Similar to banks. Su-
pervision conducted
by the special agen-
cies established to re-
gulate savings banks.
Strict enforcement of
bank regulations.
Strict supervision by
the Bank of Spain.
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